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THE INSPIRATION for this paper is obvious. I refer to the Eduardo
Galeano’s classic, The Open Veins of Latin America. We ask ourselves,
therefore, can the open veins of Latin America be transformed into
open paths toward its liberation, toward the reduction of its internal
inequalities, toward the return of economic development, toward a
new place in the contemporary world? Is there a dialectical transfor-
mation of “open veins” into “open paths,” or shall we continue to read
Borges as master of our mirage?
It is convenient not to make a precarious repetition of what can
be found expressed in ECLAC papers: the last two decades witnessed
stagnation, backward movement or, at most, in some cases, mediocre
growth. Latin America was subjugated by neoliberalism –let us call it
by the name with which it became popularized in criticism, although
it is, in itself, somewhat confusing– in the last period of last century,
and continues under its domination. We are the region with the great-
est inequality, even in comparison with Africa. Internally, inequality
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increased in our societies between the beginning of the 1990s and the
beginning of 2000. Mexico and Brazil almost haven’t changed in this
period but more egalitarian societies such as Argentina and Uruguay
stood out for a process of a radical social polarization. The known
exception is the usual one: Cuba, which receives us so generously, but
whose own progress is truncated by the general stagnation of Latin
America, which causes it to take on the risks of “socialism in one coun-
try alone.” Which in no way diminishes but rather exalts its dignity
and the immense sacrifices of its people.
Within the general diagnosis, specific situations are hidden:
from the sizzling transformation of Mexico into the largest individual
exporter to the United States, within the sphere of FTA –which, never-
theless, did not prevent the default of its foreign debt in the early
1990s nor allowed a solution to the issue of Mexican inequality– to the
deafening failure and incredible regression of Argentina, once, in the
early twentieth century, one of the world’s five largest economies.
Chile saw the least erratic development since the Pinochet dictator-
ship, but its workers already taste the bitter grapes –in a beautiful
wine-growing country– of privatized social security, now that the
moment has come to pay the bill. In any case, the Chilean isolation-
ism with regard to Latin America places it in an almost exclusive
dependence on the North American market, and in fact Chile has
regressed in terms of the social division of labor –it has returned to its
condition of an primary-exporting economy still anchored in the good
old state-owned copper. The Uruguayan and Paraguayan economies
suffer the effects of the Argentine backsliding and of Brazil’s neoliber-
alism and MERCOSUR hasn’t been enough, in the state in which it
finds itself, to give them their dynamism back. Colombia has become
a tragedy, the characteristics of which we are all familiar with, and is
on its way to transforming itself into a non-State and into a non-
nation. Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia experienced such violent spasms
that not even the most boldest social science will risk making predic-
tions: it is possible to go from the Shining Path to Alberto Fujimori
and from the latter to Alejandro Toledo, from experiments in the
Margaret Thatcher style avant la lettre to Evo Morales, and from dol-
larization with a forceps to the anti-capitalist indigenous movement,
virtually without mediation. Venezuela suffered the most unrestrained
corruption under the most social-democratic party the continent has
known, and has been daily experiencing innumerable attempts to
destabilize its Bolivarian revolution, including the scandalous attack
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against the presidency of the republic personally led by the president
of the businessmen’s association.
Rather than a rosary of our weaknesses, what this brief listing
describes is the extremely strong erosion of democratic and republi-
can institutions by neoliberalism, an open declaration of war by capi-
tal against the possibilities of political action. Paraphrasing Atilio
Boron –this Executive Secretary who with his courageous team car-
ried out the true miracle of recovering our CLACSO– capitalism in the
periphery is showing itself to be totally incompatible with democracy.
After the crisis of the dictatorships, a breath of liberty swept
over Latin America. All over the continent, the revitalization of politics
operated by the conjunction of rising social movements, renewed
labor movements (clear-cut case of Brazil), the foreign-debt crises, the
creation of new mass parties centered on the workers (once again the
Brazilian example with the Workers’ Party or PT), the patching up of
misguided party antagonisms (typical being the Chilean reconciliation
between Christian Democrats and socialists), the new alignment with-
in Argentina’s Justicialism, the popular rejection of Andresist corrup-
tion in Venezuela and a renewed identification with Bolivarian ideas,
generated the miracle of the democratization of Latin America. And
with it, the promises of banishing the almost Auschwitzian neoliber-
alism experiments. For the first time in the history of the region, in its
thirty-five countries there existed no dictatorial régime. It seemed that
the grotesque mix of dictators, minor chieftains, and petty tyrants in a
few pseudo-democratic régimes had ended, to give way to the unani-
mous predominance of democracy.
However, something entirely unforeseen happened. Perhaps we
had underestimated the “dirty work” of the dictatorships, the havoc
wreaked in the social structure, in the increase in inequalities, in the
governmental ability to regulate conflicts, in the identity between the
national project for the dominant classes and the national project for
the dominated classes. A kind of asynchrony, to say the least, had
taken place: the bourgeoisies gave up on a national project, and the
space of politics was, thus, transformed into a confinement for the
dominated classes. The wave of democratization was encapsulated by
globalization, with all its consequences: the dictatorships had defini-
tively inserted the economies of Latin America in the financialization
of capital, which to an extreme degree sterilized the power of the state
in this new and original democratization.
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The response of the political forces that took over government power
after the dictatorships was to step up the pace to complete the work of
financialization, attempting to insert the different countries, under
diverse formulas, in a mistaken, supposedly homogenizing globaliza-
tion. Customs protection was eliminated in the name of the benefits of
free trade, the government corporations which had constituted them-
selves into the pillars of industrialization since the 1950s were priva-
tized, and the labor markets structured into a precarious Welfare State
were deregulated in different ways. Some went quite far: through inte-
gration into FTA Mexico lost its autonomy for any economic policy;
Argentina privatized everything and established a dollarization that
ended by eliminating all non-customs protection and reached the limit
of setting up the parity between the peso and the dollar as a law, thus
denying those who had been elected the capacity to govern. De la Rúa
was the paroxysm of this destatization of the currency. Brazil, under
the double mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, privatized the
powerful government-owned industrial base, retaining only Petrobrás,
in a transfer of property that endorsed the structures of power and the
relations between classes and between the latter and politics. There
still remained a significant private industrial base, undercut, however,
by opening up trade indiscriminately. It would be lengthy, tedious and
superfluous, in the face of the formidable arsenal of data, analyses and
interpretations by ECLAC, to reconstruct the disasters expressed in
the main economic indicators.
This fragmentation of class relations is not without conse-
quences for politics, radicalizing social tensions to an unsuspected
degree, and a political step of such magnitude is required that the very
implosion of class relations advises against waiting. The high levels of
unemployment and of informal employment dethroned from a politi-
cally central position the categories organized in formal employment
to which they had risen: even the election of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da
Silva to the presidency of the Brazilian republic did not entail the wax-
ing of labor power as the political basis of the PT. It has a different
meaning. Unemployment and off-the-books employment, which in a
country like Brazil reached something like 60% of the economically
active population –and in Argentina the percentage is even greater–
created a new class that the political lexicon of the left and of the
social sciences isn’t even capable of naming: they are not informal
workers, they are unemployed but not jobless: they are not a “margin-
al mass” in the conception of José Nun: they are a lumpen peasantry,
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without the pejorative nuance that the term undeniably had in the
hands of the bearded one of Tiers. It is in politics that they become a
lumpen; or, better said, it is in anti-politics.
This powerful deconstruction destroys the relations of represen-
tation: who is represented today by the parties themselves that arose
from the old social bases? Whom does Argentina’s Justicialism, by
itself already divided into powerful bureaucratic and even gangster-
like fractions, represent? The picketers? Ask them themselves. Does
the PT represent the sixty percent of the sum of informal workers and
unemployed in Brazil? Do the traditional political parties of Colombia
represent the forces in conflict for over 30 years, worsened by the
arrival of the paramilitaries on the scene? Evo Morales is the new man
of the coca growers, and he constitutes real news, because Bolivia’s
parties had long ceased to have any truly popular insertion, and the
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) went over to the oli-
garchies’ side a long time ago. The indigenous movement in Ecuador
is also a novelty, in the same sense as the movement in Bolivia.
Fujimori was a conservative reaction to anarchy: but the immense
digestive system of the plundering dominant classes quickly swal-
lowed him and transformed him into the greatest symbol of the cor-
rupt impunity of the old Peruvian dominant classes. Toledo comes
with Stanford in his baggage and already experiences a demoraliza-
tion that makes his Ph.D. impotent.
Institutional politics spin ineffectually, because the conditions
and the constraints imposed by globalization make democratic and
republican institutions useless and superfluous. Central Banks are the
real national authorities, and they are not democratic institutions. In
the Schmittian definition, the sovereign is he who decides the State of
Exception. National States have turned into States of Exception: all
public policies are policies of exception. And who decides among us?
Institutional policy led the most transformation-minded popu-
lar forces into a trap. It is these new popular forces, which finally
reached the thresholds of power, which implement the exception: of
the surpluses agreed on with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
of the pressure to institute the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), of the submission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), of
our conversion to free exchange and free trade.
Latin America has forgotten the fundamental lesson of Raúl
Prebisch, about the asymmetry of forces in the center-periphery rela-
tionship. Meanwhile, the national bourgeoisies, entirely subordinated
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to globalization, renounce politics. They prefer to place their trust in
the mechanisms so revealingly pointed out by Foucault: compulsory
coercion, procedures, institutionalities, etc. All of them, automatisms
that annul politics.
The Brazilian case illustrates this to satiety: Lula’s government,
which promised to be transformative, surrendered to obligations;
there is no political opposition, even opposition by economic sectors,
whichever they might be. The paradox thus emerges that the forces
that won the elections struggle among themselves, while the dominant
classes provoke the conflicts: the case of land reform in Brazil is noth-
ing but that. The Landless Movement (MST) attempts to obtain gov-
ernment compliance with the necessary number of settlements, and
the government doesn’t carry the land reform out, perhaps not
because of a lack of political will but because of the surpluses in fiscal
approaches imposed by the IMF, while the media exaggerate the con-
flict between the MST and the government. Consequently, both are
weakened and anti-land reform positions begin to strengthen.
It should also be doubted that the neoliberal period has exhaust-
ed its agenda. To provide an example, let us return to the case of the
Brazilian government which continues to deepen the neoliberal
“reforms.” Now, assuming that the neoliberal agenda is really exhaust-
ed, the issue that appears is a more complex one: what should be done
to repair the deep organizational wearing down of the working class-
es and minimally restore the regulatory capacity of an entirely pillaged
state? How is economic growth to the restarted if the government
investment that was decisive in the industrialization of Latin America
is impossible because government finances have been strangled by the
heavy servicing of the domestic and foreign debt and the privatiza-
tions? Trust in the market as a mechanism for the distribution of
resources must be cast into doubt even more vigorously than in the
golden days of ECLAC, considering that the distribution of income has
worsened, and therefore investments only go to the sectors that han-
dle the demands of the high-income classes, perpetuating the perverse
concentration already pointed out and condemned by Celso Furtado.
Economic growth without a redistribution of income becomes even
more concentrating, and without the state as a regulatory force the
transformative project has everything needed to be the executioner of
its own promise.
What is left in Latin America to the national states that are pre-
cluded from acting on development policies is the administration of
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the policies of functionalization of poverty. These are policies of excep-
tion that transform the states into States of Exception. They are mar-
keting states that invent names such as “bolsa-escola” (school scholar-
ship), “bolsa-alimentação” (food scholarship), “primeiro-emprego”
(first job), “começar de novo” (new beginning), “Fome Zero” (Hunger
Zero) –the most pretentious of all, which shows up the anti-universal
character of these policies with extreme clarity. Meanwhile the social
security policies that promoted a greater redistribution of income in
the annals of capitalism in the central countries are annulled in the
periphery by the privatizations and the “reforms” –the new term for
semantic piracy.
As labor forces have been highly eroded, and have lost the abili-
ty to propose policies and carry them out, or to veto the anti-reforms,
the national states of Latin America are close to what, in the past, the
literature called populism. But the name is equivocal; that populism
entailed the inclusion along “the passive path,” in an authoritarian
m a n n e r, of the working classes in politics, while neopopulism –let us
accept it for now– implies the exclusion of workers from politics and
their transformation into the objects of compensatory policies. May
Nun forgive me, but through the policies for the functionalization of
poverty the “marginal mass” turns into the maintenance of the “reserve
armies” suitable for more primitive work processes, with which to win
a functional spot in the accumulation of capital. It isn’t poverty, how-
e v e r, that moves that accumulation, but the molecular-digital revolu-
tion at the dynamic center that makes poverty functional for the accu-
mulation of capital. The economies of Latin America now belong to the
platypus family, a lopsided combination of high income, conspicuous
consumption, accumulation of capital commanded by the molecular-
digital revolution, extreme poverty, modern lumpen-peasantry, and
subjection by financial capital, technical and scientific ineff e c t u a l n e s s .
Argentina, which had given us the only Nobel in a scientific field, phys-
iology-biology-medicine, now lies asleep at the Recoleta cemetery: here
lies the promise of a nation.
Why is the challenge greater today than that which arose in the
years of “developmentalism” (desarrollismo), which found its best for-
mulator in the brave ECLAC? Firstly for a fundamental strategic rea-
son: the previous situation –characterized by an “unequal exchange”
between producers of raw materials (Latin America) and producers of
manufactured goods (the dynamic center)– could be overcome by put-
ting into practice ECLAC’s proposal par excellence: industrialization.
116
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Today, globalization is above all a financial system. The principal con-
tradiction doesn’t refer to the fact that it is the multinationals them-
selves who are present in the industrialization that substitutes for
imports –which worsens financial dependence because it is one of its
structuring elements– but the fact that it is global money (the dollar
and the euro) which constitutes the prior assumption and the result of
the financing of the economies of the Latin American periphery. In
other words, it is international money itself which finances Latin
America’s productive activity. And there is no “substitutive industrial-
ization” for global money. In this case, the medicine kills. The equa-
tion of dependence and that of its solution are more complex.
